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A B S T R A C T
Through their consumption behavior, households are responsible for 72% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Thus,
they are key actors in reaching the 1.5 °C goal under the Paris Agreement. However, the possible contribution and
position of households in climate policies is neither well understood, nor do households receive sufficiently high
priority in current climate policy strategies. This paper investigates how behavioral change can achieve a substantial
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in European high-income countries. It uses theoretical thinking and some core
results from the HOPE research project, which investigated household preferences for reducing emissions in four
European cities in France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The paper makes five major points: First, car and plane
mobility, meat and dairy consumption, as well as heating are the most dominant components of household footprints.
Second, household living situations (demographics, size of home) greatly influence the household potential to reduce
their footprint, even more than country or city location. Third, household decisions can be sequential and temporally
dynamic, shifting through different phases such as childhood, adulthood, and illness. Fourth, short term voluntary
efforts will not be sufficient by themselves to reach the drastic reductions needed to achieve the 1.5 °C goal; instead,
households need a regulatory framework supporting their behavioral changes. Fifth, there is a mismatch between the
roles and responsibilities conveyed by current climate policies and household perceptions of responsibility. We then
conclude with further recommendations for research and policy.
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1. Background and theory
Household consumption contributes to 72% of global greenhouse
gas emissions (with the remainder coming from public and non-
governmental and financial sources) [1]. Household behavior therefore
is an essential component in climate policies, especially in high income
countries such as those in Europe, Australia and North America [2]. We
need to know how willing households are to change, and to what extent
proactive behavioral changes will be mobilized by climate policy-
making [3]. According to Cafaro, individuals can save immense
amounts of carbon in a so-called “behavioral mitigation wedge”—as
much as 15 billion tons (gigatons) by 2060—simply by changing their
diet to avoid meat, or by forgoing air travel [4]. A slew of other recent
studies emphasize the climate change or sustainability co-benefits of
less carbon intensive diets and food practices [5–7]. Other data from
the Tyndall center underscores the sheer magnitude of emissions re-
ductions that behavioral change can accomplish—far more than low
carbon infrastructural supply or the political pledges under the Paris
Accord [8].
The international climate policy debate has been fixated on tech-
nology and economic incentives and has often relegated behavioral
change to an afterthought, rather than having it join the center stage.
The implication is we must become much more focused on changing
consumption, or demand side options, in addition to emphasizing mi-
tigation via technology or policy on the supply side [9,10]. We must
also consider lifestyles as targets of policies (and modeling efforts) [11],
rather than a voluntary add-on by individuals.
Indeed, very steep reductions in emissions are needed if the global
community is to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, which translate
into a reduction of emissions from 40 gigatons of carbon dioxide in
2020 to 5 gigatons in 2050, and eventually reach a level of “net zero” by
2100. Essentially, this necessitates that emissions must halve every
decade in perpetuity until the middle of the century, and then cross the
line and continue with implementing so-called negative emissions
measures until the end of the century [12]. We must accelerate tran-
sitions toward “deep decarbonisation” [13] and a “post carbon society”
[14] by 2050, if not sooner.
Due to such stringent targets, climate change mitigation will in-
creasingly affect households and their lifestyles. Yet neither existing
mitigation policies nor the Nationally Determined Contributions under
the Paris Accord keep emissions on track with an emission pathway
compatible with the 1.5 °C goal [15–17]. We need additional con-
tributions, potentially available in even more efficient production sys-
tems and negative emission technologies, but also in household life-
styles and individual behavioral change [18,19].
We then require a more balanced approach between consumption
and production regarding emission inventories and mitigation strate-
gies [20], and a more nuanced understanding of what can motivate the
household adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and technologies, be these
changes reactive (i.e. the indirect results of other policy measures) or
proactive (households being the main drivers for change) [21]. There is
a strong need to understand the barriers and motivations for con-
sumption changes at the individual level of consumers [22], especially
when connected to the urgency of global decarbonisation pathways.
Drawn from a mix of methods as part of a four year project called
HOPE—household carbon footprint assessments, simulations, and
qualitative research interviews as well as policy reviews and analy-
sis—this paper shows how behavioral change can reduce household
carbon footprints substantially by 2050. Academic debates have begun
to stress the need to supplement current climate policies with that of
addressing behavioral changes to a higher degree as compared to that
of addressing technical changes in production and infrastructure
changes. As the IPCC noted with “high confidence” recently in their
1.5 °C report, “pathways that include low energy demand (…), low
material consumption, and low GHG-intensive food consumption have
the most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs
with respect to sustainable development” [23]. The mission of the
HOPE project was to investigate the potential policy-room for man-
euver on this particular point. Furthermore, we wanted, by means of
involving household representatives in the HOPE climate game, to
trigger deep reflections on public acceptance as to how such policy
interventions best should be carried out with respect to choosing be-
tween “carrots, sticks and sermons” [24].
2. Research design: an interdisciplinary mixed-methods approach
To make the case for the salience of behavioral change, we draw
from original primary data resulting from a four-year, comparative,
mixed-methods project called HOPE (HOusehold Preferences for redu-
cing greenhouse gas Emissions in four European high-income countries)
[25–28]. More details are presented in Appendix A.
The HOPE project was an interdisciplinary study, which in-
vestigated the preferences of households across four cities in France,
Germany, Norway and Sweden. These four countries are admittedly not
representative of the world in the statistical sense. However, results are
generalizable to urban settings in OECD countries, a point which is
corroborated by the fact that relative and absolute carbon footprints
between the four cities and household preferences are very similar.
Each household was involved into the research for four to six hours.
Thus, one strength of the project is to provide deep insights into 308
household cases by triangulating results from questionnaires, simula-
tions and qualitative interviews and comparing the results from the
household analysis with an analysis of current policies.
In the HOPE project, we selected the goal of halving household
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 to represent the effort needed by
households to do their part toward achieving the 1.5-degree goal [29].
Our results derive from four distinct methods: (1) the estimation and
mapping of household carbon footprints, (2) the output of a climate
change mitigation simulation game with households, (3) in-depth
qualitative interviews, and (4) the depiction of climate policy measures
that are explicitly or implicitly aimed at influencing household con-
sumption in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
All greenhouse gases were considered and accounted for as a carbon
dioxide equivalent (CO2e). The HOPE project conducted methods (1)
and (2) across 308 households in four mid-sized European cities – Pays
d’Aix-en-Provence, France; Mannheim, Germany; Bergen, Norway; and
Umeå, Sweden. Method (3) was conducted for a subset of 64 house-
holds. Method (4) included the mapping of relevant policy measures
issued at the local (the four case cities), regional (host-counties of the
four cities) and national level (the four involved countries).
Quantitative and qualitative survey data as well as policy analysis were
triangulated in order to maximize validity of results. For more details
(beyond those offered in this section), readers are invited to see the
study protocol in Appendix A.
2.1. Method 1: Mapping empirical household carbon footprints
Assessing the carbon footprint of consumption can be done either by
a top-down approach, processing surveys of consumer expenditure or
via national accounting systems and environmentally extended in-
put–output analysis [30], or by a bottom-up approach, multiplying for a
given household some physical or monetary unit of consumption by
emission factors. Given that our aim was to support a reduction simu-
lation process at the individual level, the latter was chosen.
In order to survey households preferences in reducing their carbon
footprint we therefore developed a tool allowing a) the accurate map-
ping of empirical real household footprints, and b) a dynamic simula-
tion process, informing households about the anticipated greenhouse
gas equivalent savings, financial costs and savings, and for half of the
sample the health consequences of their sequential choices. This
Footprint Calculation and Simulation Tool (FCS-Tool) [31] was built
based on a first Microsoft Excel prototype [32] and further adapted to
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national contexts, e.g. particular emission factors of the four countries.
The FCS was based on an in-depth tailoring of solutions (e.g. basing the
calculation of CO2e savings from wall insulation on the actual size of
the house, the type of insulation, and household heating supply), on a
dynamic computation of avoided greenhouse gas emissions (to avoid
double counts, already implemented solutions, etc.) and on the valua-
tion of financial costs and savings (for more details on dynamic com-
putation see Appendix A and other published studies from the HOPE
project) [33–37].
The resulting carbon footprints convert household inputs on their
consumption behavior, expressed in financial or physical units, into
CO2e emissions. This is done by using greenhouse gas emissions factors,
adapted from international or national sources. The initial survey
covered 400 data entries for household consumption, their expenditure
on consumption and socioeconomic data. This household consumption
included all fields of personal consumption in housing, mobility, food
and other consumption (such as clothing, furniture, electronics, etc.).
We did not explicitly consider public services like education and health.
However, we did consider CO2 emissions of expenditures for insurance,
in order to capture some of these goods and services. Approximately
100 consumption data entries were converted to CO2e. The data allows
for a deeper and more detailed description of household emission pat-
terns as well as the simulation of different household emission path-
ways and their net cost implications for the households.
2.2. Method 2: Interactive mitigation simulation game with households
In attempting to capture how behavioral mitigation wedges could
work in practice, we asked households to consider the intensity and
extent of an array of tailored mitigation actions. In three rounds de-
scribed more in Appendix A, households rated and selected these ac-
tions. This “serious gaming” method [38,39] comprised 65 emission
reduction options, grouped into “Action Cards” in the areas of food,
housing, mobility and other consumption. For each action, we provided
information on its CO2e savings, its positive or negative financial costs,
and its health impact when relevant. In order to encourage participa-
tion and minimize the risk of selection bias (i.e., that only en-
vironmentally concerned people would participate), we offered mone-
tary incentives to participate in the simulation.
First, we asked household representatives to rate mitigation actions
on a Likert scale from 1 (very willing) to 5 (not willing), i.e. “Imagine
you would be required to reduce your carbon footprint by 50% by
2030. To reach this goal, how willing are you to implement the fol-
lowing actions?” Second, we asked them to consider voluntary actions,
i.e. “Which actions would you actually like to implement to reduce your
carbon footprint by 50% by 2030?” We finally asked them to consider
“forced” or mandatory options, i.e. “Which actions would you choose if
you were forced to reduce your carbon footprint by 50% by 2030?
Continue your rank order from round 2. You may choose up to 30 ac-
tions in total.” This choice of having a voluntary and a forced scenario
allows us to distinguish the spontaneous choices from the ones made
under stringent circumstances.
2.3. Method 3: Qualitative household interviews
Qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out
with a sub-sample of households participating in the simulation game
using a common interview guide aiming to explore their knowledge and
perception of climate change and household mitigation options.
Maximum variation sampling was used to recruit a diverse set of in-
formants covering a diversity of socioeconomic characteristics such as
age, gender, income, education, type of housing, location of housing,
etc. [40]. In addition, recruitment of interviewees was informed by
findings from methods 1 and 2, such as households with big or small
initial footprints and high or low rates of reduction. The final sample
size of each country sample was determined by the qualitative principle
of data saturation [41]. Following this method, we reached a final
sample size of 64 interviews across all countries for the qualitative
study component.
2.4. Method 4: Policy analysis
Assessing the efficacy of climate policies, and thus also comparing
the outcome between different nations, regions or public bodies, has
gained increased research attention as the recognition that more am-
bitious mitigation efforts needs to be in place has also increased. Still,
there is a limited knowledge with respect to comparability of findings in
this area of research, often owing to lack of a common understanding of
what policy output “is”, and highly variable methods for comparing
policy outputs [42] and defining the object of comparison [43]. The
“proof of the pudding” when comparing and measuring the success of
climate policy would be to assess the actual reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions, but that would entail a very comprehensive research design
far outside of the resource limit of the HOPE project.
Thus, we had to settle with collecting indicators of policy success. A
frequently used approach, also in climate policy studies, is to analyze
the policy density, i.e. the number of policy instruments [44,45]. This
rather simplistic approach has its disadvantages, most obvious that of
counting “apples and pears” and giving equal weight to powerful as
compared to less powerful policy measures. This can be partly coun-
teracted by choosing a policy taxonomy that allows for some sort of
differentiation as to mitigation potential. Furthermore, even a simplistic
way of counting policy measures can allow for doing valid relative – if
not absolute – comparison between the chosen objects of study.
For each of the four countries, we mapped their energy and climate
“policies” to that of the more tangible output of political processes [46].
Moreover, we limited the scope of coverage to that of plans, strategies
and steering instruments designed to achieve policy goals that are ap-
proved through political processes [47]. This meant our policy analysis
began by examining exactly what “policies” were available and sug-
gested in official documents like government green papers, white pa-
pers, and legislative acts [25].
The aim of the policy mapping was to categorize any policies that
affect household greenhouse gas emissions either directly or indirectly.
Our mapping generally excluded supply-side policies (i.e. policies
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from production) unless
they fell into a gray zone (i.e. city planning for mobility or fuel mix
regulations). The focus was on policies issued by government bodies at
the national level, as well as the regional and local levels of the case
city. EU policies were assumed to be implemented at subsidiary levels
of government and therefore not mapped separately.
Policy data was gathered through the Odyssee-Mure database [49],
official reports to international organizations and government data-
bases from the national, regional and local levels of government. The
resulting corpus included 250 policies that were coded along three di-
mensions in accordance with the policy categories used in the IPCC
Fifth Assessment Report [50]: (1) policy area (housing, mobility, food
and other consumption); (2) anticipated policy mechanism (change
patterns or volumes of consumption); and (3) policy instruments (eco-
nomic instruments, information policies, public goods and services, and
regulatory approaches).
2.5. Setting technical and behavioral targets
With our methods established, our next task was to propose a
quantified target for a behavioral-related reduction of household
greenhouse gas emissions, in the context of low carbon scenarios, to a
time horizon that remained imaginable for the interviewees.
Technical energy efficiency solutions essentially reduce emissions
per unit of production (e.g. from manufacturing private cars) and/or
offering products or services with lower emissions per unit of con-
sumption (e.g. private cars with better mileage). For this to result in
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absolute reductions of emissions—and not merely relative re-
ductions—we also need to obtain control over or abate rebound effects
[51,52], which are always challenging to model accurately [53]. The
extent of non-mitigated rebound effects is thus an important reason
why technical improvements do not always meet projected reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions [54,55].
Behavioral solutions involve an active effort in changing the nature,
or in some cases the amount, of consumption. This can be presented in
order of qualitative changes to take place, i.e. across a typology of (1)
renouncement, e.g. giving up owning a car; (2) reduction, e.g. reducing
your mobility; (3) substitution between categories of consumption, e.g.
using public transportation instead of a private car; and (4) substitution
within a specific category of consumption, e.g. continue using your
private car, but buying a more efficient one [56]. The two first cate-
gories deal with degrees of changing the volume of consumption,
whereas the last two address qualitatively different ways of changing
patterns of consumption. Later in the article, we investigate what
households themselves thought about the behavioral solutions that they
control across these dimensions.
Conceptually, we are interested in the notion of rapid reductions in
emissions or greatly accelerating decarbonisation efforts. Although a
combined pace of technical efficiency and behavioral solutions of 1%
per annum would lead to a halving of emissions in 2050, a combined
pace of 3% would (theoretically) reduce emissions almost by a factor 10
greater in 2050. Consequently, our project was implicitly embedded in
the vision of a transition toward a very low carbon society. Indeed this
reference objective of minus 50% reduction by 2030 due to behavioral
change, combined with technical energy efficiency (with a control of
the potential rebound effect), would correspond to an overall mitigation
of more than 70% of household emissions by 2030 and 95% by 2050. In
annual terms, this corresponds to a faster pace of 4% in reductions per
year, largely compatible with a 1.5 °C warming scenario by 2100.
3. The complexity of household decision-making: five empirical
insights
This section makes five major points, which we derive from some
core empirical and conceptual findings from the HOPE project. These
are: (1) that car and plane mobility, meat and dairy consumption, and
heating dominate footprints; (2) that household living situations or
demographics influence preferences and possibilities for greenhouse
gas reduction while there is little difference between countries; (3) that
household decisions can be sequential and temporally dynamic; (4) that
voluntary efforts will not be sufficient by themselves to achieve drastic
reductions; and (5) that there is a mismatch between the roles and re-
sponsibilities conveyed by current climate policies and household per-
ceptions of responsibility. Again, more data about the specific meth-
odologies or details behind these findings is offered in Appendix A.
3.1. Mobility, food, and heating dominate household consumption
footprints
The baseline carbon footprint (CF) assessments of households par-
ticipating in the HOPE study found the mobility sector to be the most
significant contributor to a median household's footprint. Emissions of
greenhouse gases were accounted for by CO2 equivalents (CO2e). As
Fig. 1 reveals, mobility made up 34% of the CF with a median value of
2.9 tons CO2e per household member, followed by food, which made up
30%.
The CF for housing is dominated by heating, representing a total of
0.5 tons per consumption unit across all four countries, covering 44% of
emissions in this sector. Emissions derive largely from energy con-
sumption which resulted in some variations between countries de-
pending on what major source of energy they used (nuclear, hydro-
power, district heating, etc.). Food footprints were dominated by red
meat, dairy, and other food, and did not show country wise variation
with the exception of France due to higher numbers of reported meals
eaten at restaurants and schools. Mobility's baseline CF was pre-
dominantly composed of air travel, car travel, and other motorized
travel.
Looking at the results geographically, the households median
baseline CF was lowest for Swedish participants (7.3 tons), followed by
the French (10 tons), German (10.2 tons), and Norwegian participants
with 11.3 tons CO2e per CU per year. At baseline, households in France
and Germany used their car for longer daily distances (36 km and
27 km) and more often for commuting than households in Norway and
Sweden (16 km and 14 km). Norwegian households in our sample used
more inland flights than the rest of our sample
This sequence of relative shares of mobility, food, and housing
footprints is confirmed by the literature, be it results obtained by a top
down approach starting from national accounts or consumers survey
(for instance Lenglart et al. [57]) or by carbon calculators. The com-
parison of calculators however reveals some discrepancies depending
on perimeters, emission factors, and uncertainty ranges. For instance,
one study calculated the emissions on a household basis (three persons)
for five calculators in an Irish context [58]. After the correction of the
most obvious causes of discrepancy, e.g. an uplift factor of three for
aviation in one calculator, the range is reduced. A second study did the
same type of exercise for another set of calculators in the United States
context [59]. The discrepancy of results vary from the mean, with
−60%/+46% for electricity emissions, −17%/+11% for fuel con-
sumption, −11%/+12% for personal vehicles, −44%/+113% for air
transport.
3.2. Demographics greatly influence household intention to reduce
footprints, more than location
Household footprints and preferences for reducing them were very
similar across countries—perhaps unsurprising given our four cities
were fairly homogenous in terms of northern climate and common
access to European markets—but differed along some demographic
household characteristics. Utilizing Multiple Components Analysis (or
MCA, see Appendix A for more details) and statistical tests (such as chi-
square), differences between countries are less important than differ-
ences linked to household profiles (e.g. heating type, travel by plane or
not). In simpler terms: the home country or city of the household never
had a significant effect on preferences, as Fig. 2 indicates; instead,
differences between subjects were not country-specific but subject-
specific.
Household footprints vary first of all depending on level of income,
perhaps obviously. Thus, minor variations between countries is a reflec-
tion of this (see the small variations on geographical footprints noted in
Section 3.1). The main difference observed is that Norway (and partly
Fig. 1. Initial median carbon footprint (kg CO2e per consumption unit per year)
for HOPE households.
Source: Authors, based on HOPE data.
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Sweden) has more aviation. The more obvious differences in energy
supply systems, such as more hydroelectricity in Norway, and more coal in
Germany, has been partially hidden since we have applied a generic
Nordic electricity mix for Norway and Sweden, and a generic European
mix on greenhouse gas emissions for electricity use in France and Ger-
many.
Nonetheless, one important characteristic influencing preferences
was home ownership. Many actions in the housing sector with high
potential for emissions reduction were not feasible for renters, espe-
cially rental units occupied by younger households living close to city
centers. According to the qualitative interviews, renters often thought
that it was hard to find an apartment meeting the highest energy effi-
ciency standards and that renovation of their current apartment was up
to their landlord. The landlords (or owners) themselves argued for
subsidies for their investments in energy efficiency and asked for sim-
pler procedures.
This suggest that despite differences in climate, policy, and other
national contexts, differences in reducing footprints were not country
specific but largely household specific. Thus, there is tremendous po-
tential for developing more policies to reduce consumption-related
greenhouse gas emissions on the European level. However, according to
Ivanova et al. [30], the carbon footprint per capita of Europeans (based
on consumer surveys and environmentally extended input-output ana-
lysis) show more important differences, ranging from 5 tons of CO2e per
capita in Romania to more than 16 tons of CO2e per capita in Finland,
northern Greece, or the United Kingdom.
3.3. Household decisions and preferences can be sequential or ephemeral
Conceptually, household carbon footprints are not static: there are
key strategic moments such as when a person decides where to live,
where to invest, whether to buy a car or not, or whether to build a
house or not, which can be significant. Similarly, major life events such
as graduating from university, having children, buying a house, having
the children leave home, retiring, or suffering a medical condition can
also substantially affect emissions trajectories. Büchs et al. for instance
reported that incidences of illness and poor health are generally linked
to lower home energy use and reduced mobility, but that it is also
linked to higher electricity consumption when income and other de-
mographic attributes are controlled for [60]. Sovacool et al. found that
old age was associated with greater mobility needs as well as a stronger
preference for conventional cars [61].
Fig. 3 illustrates the temporality or ephemerality of theoretical
carbon footprints in the HOPE project, showing how household con-
sumption patterns can change significantly based on strategic decisions
and major life events. The top panel (3A) presents one potential tra-
jectory, showing the sequential nature of emissions related to house-
hold decisions about mobility. The bottom panel (3B) shows evolution
of housing and mobility related emissions across a typified life, based
on cross-sectional data from HOPE carbon footprints. The punctuated
equilibrium of emissions that results is heavily influenced by major life
events such as having children, retiring, or falling ill.
3.4. The greater the mitigation potential of an action, the less willing are
households to implement them
Voluntary actions are limited and insufficient in the reductions they
can secure. During the HOPE simulation game, households were asked
to choose up to 65 different mitigation actions across the dimensions of
food and recycling, housing, mobility, and other consumption. In the
consumption category for food and recycling, households reached more
of their total reduction (56%) in the voluntary round (36%) than in the
Fig. 2. Differences in voluntary carbon footprint reduction preferences by geographic location (country) for HOPE households.
Source: Authors.
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“forced” one (20%). This is similar to the composition of total reduc-
tions (49%) in the housing sector (29% voluntary, 20% forced).
The relationship was turned around for mobility. In the mobility
sector, they reduced more than half of their total reduction (59%) in the
forced scenario (26% in the voluntary and 33% in the forced scenario).
Voluntarily, households chose actions characterized by fairly incre-
mental efficiency improvements such as eco-driving or substituting
local public transport with walking and biking instead of more
substantial changes such as reducing intercontinental flights or giving
up their cars. More specifically, eco-driving (driving more efficiently)
was the most popular mobility measure, and while buying a more eco-
friendly car was chosen by 34% of households, only 4% were ready to
give up their private car in the voluntary round. In particular, house-
holds that had flown were rather unwilling to replace even shorter
transportation modes.
Basically, mobility is a more vexing issue to decarbonize because
Fig. 3. The sequential and temporal nature of household carbon footprints. (a) Top panel: typical decision branching points for mobility related emissions. (b) Bottom
panel: household lifestyles and changes in household and mobility carbon footprints based on major life events. Carbon footprints per consumption unit based on
HOPE sub sample (n=308).
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people attach personal values to it like having good relations with
friends and relatives, experiencing cultural and natural diversity or
getting a better education. As one household in Germany (male, 44
years old) explained when interviewed:
It is important to have a semester abroad in your CV. The companies
think: Hey, this guy is motivated, he wants to learn, he is flexible, he has
been to the US for a year. It sounds better, than saying: Oh well, yes, this
guy is organic, he is climate-friendly, he decided to stay at home and not
pollute the air.
Their statement implies that international travel is key to status as
well as individual perceptions of career ambition, education, and
identity.
For food, the most popular actions were to buy goods with less
packaging, eat less frozen/canned food, and eat 30% more local, 30%
more organic and 30% more vegetarian food. Based on our household
interviews, we know an important reason why participants were willing
to reduce more in the consumption area of food was that climate-
friendly actions were frequently connected to more positive values like
animal welfare (e.g. better living conditions) and environmental pro-
tection (e.g. less use of fertilizer). As another household (female, 47
years old) in France mentioned during an interview:
If I buy milk or cheese, I want that the animals were kept properly and
what is also important for me, is that the people, who are part of the
production, earn proper money. And therefore I find it ok, […] if such
food has its price.
Put another way: the mitigation actions with highest willingness for
implementation were moderate actions related to food and recycling
[62].
However, to achieve the study target of a 50% reduction in foot-
prints, households needed “forced” solutions because voluntary mea-
sures were insufficient. Somewhat perversely, the greater the CO2e
reduction potential of mitigation actions, the less household were
willing to implement them [63], because the actions with greater mi-
tigation potential reflect greater lifestyle changes. When looking at
household choices of action cards to reduce their greenhouse gas
emission, a negative association was found between voluntarily chosen
action and reduction potential, as Fig. 4 illustrates. In this figure, the
dots represent the 65 mitigation actions classified in the four con-
sumption categories: other consumption, food, housing and mobility.
The Y-axis shows the most chosen actions in the voluntary round. For
each household sector, a negative association was present for mobility,
food, and housing, but less for other consumption as the reduction
potentials for this last sector are relatively low. For instance, 38% of
participants voluntarily chose to eat 30% more vegetarian food, yet
only 4% chose to become a vegetarian. Similarly, buying a more eco-
Fig. 4. Household preferences for mitigation actions and carbon reduction potential in the HOPE project.
Note: Each symbol represents one mitigation action. The x-axis shows how much reduction of CO2e an action yielded for households (per consumption unit) on
average. The y-axis shows the percentage of households that chose an action in the voluntary scenario. The colors correspond to the four different categories of
consumption (food, mobility, housing, and other consumption). The reference of 100% are those households that were able to choose the specific actions. For
instance, 128 out of all 308 households had used intercontinental flights at baseline. 10 of those 128 chose the action reduce your intercontinental flights by 90%. Thus,
the action was unpopular and is found on the lower part of the panel. At the same time, the action is placed on the right side of the panel, as it yielded a large of CO2e
reduction per capita of about 1000 kg.
G. Dubois, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 144–158
150
Fig. 5. Climate policies for household decarbonisation (n=250). Top panel: share of identified climate policies in four high income countries (Sweden, Norway,
Germany and France) aimed at altering private consumption. Bottom panel: share of policy-measures categorized as market versus command-and-control distributed
among the four consumption areas in the HOPE project.
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friendly car was chosen by 34% of households, yet only 4% were ready
to give up their private car. This association vanished in the forced
round, which shows that households then had to choose actions with
high reduction potential to reach a reduction of 50%. The most
greenhouse gas-reducing behavioral options were mainly chosen in the
“forced” scenario.
3.5. Household perceptions do not always align with policy design
The HOPE analysis resulted in identifying a total of 250 distinct
climate policy measures with the potential to influence household
emissions, which we divided roughly into market based (economic in-
struments, information policies) and command and control (regulatory
approaches and public goods and services). Our first finding was a
mismatch between emissions and policy profiles, at least for the food
sector, as it accounted for 30% of household greenhouse gas emissions
but only related to 9% of policy measures on an unweighted basis, as
Fig. 5 reveals.
For the other three sectors the share of emissions and policy mea-
sures more or less matched. More importantly, we found that the high-
emitting consumption categories received the least policy attention, in
particular aviation and diet changes. Only 1.2% of the policies identi-
fied correspond to each of the two, whereas emissions from aviation
accounts for approximately 25% of total household emissions.1
Furthermore, categorizing the identified policy measures in our two
main categories – market based versus command-and-control – reveals
that different consumption areas were governed by different policy
strategies. As the bottom panel of Fig. 4 indicates, the mobility sector
had a rather high share of command-and-control policies. Governance
in the three other sectors relies much more on market-based ap-
proaches. This dominance of market-based policy approaches in-
dividualizes responsibility for mitigation [25]. Consumers ultimately
have to decide whether to mitigate or not, based on the prices they face,
as well as their values, culture, habits, and the information they re-
ceived. On the one hand, the policies influencing individual decisions in
the two important areas of greenhouse gas emissions, air travel and
diet, were almost exclusively market-based. Additionally, they received
minimal policy attention. On the other hand, command-and-control
policies were frequently used to lower emissions for housing and per-
sonal cars.
In our household interviews, we found that people often accept
individual responsibility for their footprints, but at the same time called
for government action to create consumption changes in areas with
large, untapped mitigation potential. As one interview respondent from
Sweden (female, 67 years old) put it:
I have already done a lot. What do others do, […] why should I care,
when others don’t? I can do the sacrifice […] and put climate first only if
everyone helps. If it will be a law everyone has to do it.
Thus, people such as this were only ready to act if every-
one—including individuals and other societal players, like businesses
and governments—acted in concert collectively. Households did not
limit this collective action to the national sphere, but many emphasized
that climate change mitigation could only work on the European or
even international scale. In some areas, for instance changing to a more
climate friendly diet by reducing consumption of meat, households
called for stronger policy interventions that would make it easier for
them to choose climate-friendly options. In less preferred mitigation
areas, such as flying, stronger policy interventions (e.g. higher taxes or
reduced availability of air travel) were only perceived to be acceptable
if they would apply to “everyone”. Many households understood that in
less preferred areas with large untapped mitigation potential, such as
mobility, only government-led infrastructural investments or other
regulative acts could create substantial consumption changes, whether
people liked it or not.
4. Conclusions
Households will undoubtedly shape future emissions pathways in
complex and meaningful ways. They are influential stakeholders in
climate polities with substantial control over emissions profiles in their
respective households and countries. Yet their potential for achieving
such drastic reductions in carbon footprints is uncertain. Rather than
focusing mainly on household appliances, heat or electricity provision,
our results suggest research and policy should deal with cars, air traffic,
and eating meat. Mobility and food together accounted for about 64%
of a HOPE household's initial median carbon footprint—emphasizing
the salience of policies aimed in these directions to help mitigate cli-
mate change. Also, there is a gap between how households perceive
their responsibility and ability to mitigate climate change and the re-
sponsibilities and roles communicated by climate policies. Addressing
this mismatch requires that policy measures are selected that would
materialize consumption changes in two high emitting areas of con-
sumption: air travel and meat consumption. So far, scant attention has
been paid to policy measures affecting these two areas, especially those
that use command and control rather than the market. Perhaps this is
because mobility and food are more difficult for households to con-
ceptualize as major contributors to their footprints; or, that efforts to
address mobility and food are seen as more personal, and tied to things
like status and identity, and thus more likely to be unpopular.
We showed that demographic attributes such as household size and
ownership status were more significant than geographic location in
determining preferences for reducing carbon footprints. Household
footprints were shown to shift significantly over time following a
household lifecycle, as a function of major decisions (such as pur-
chasing a car or home) or major life events (such as having children or
getting divorced). This underscores both the necessity of targeting those
specific events via policy as well as the important role that inter-
mediaries related to those moments—estate agents for homes, retire-
ment planners, and car dealerships [65]—can play in shaping pre-
ferences.
Importantly, households will only reduce about half of what they
should to reach the reduction targets commensurate with reaching the
1.5 °C goal. Further substantial emissions reductions need strong and
effective public policies incentivizing and supporting changes, the
proverbial mix of carrots and sticks. Even then, mobility seems to be
“stickier” [66] and more difficult to decarbonize. We need to rely on
stronger policy interventions more than, or at least in addition to, al-
truism. This may require limiting availability of GHG-intensive con-
sumption through regulative instruments like bans and restrictions or
coercive economic instruments such as a “considerably higher” carbon
tax on fuel [67]. This should be balanced with making less GHG-in-
tensive alternatives more readily available, both financially and struc-
turally [68]. The good news is such actions do have support, a social
license or broader legitimacy, among HOPE participants.
Driving changes in attitudes, norms, or practices could shape con-
sumption habits - and thus create motives for further voluntary changes
to then emerge [69]. Nonetheless, we may have to rely on forced
consumption changes in order to buy us time to take advantage of
technology. Fortunately, the HOPE project documents a high will-
ingness to accept some moderate lifestyle changes, for instance related
to food. Therefore, we believe that regulations targeting areas such as
less packed food or more local and organic farming will be supported
and even be cherished by the public. However, areas such as mobility
(especially air travel) are more difficult. An intelligent mix of improving
infrastructure and creating incentives as well as regulating in specific
1 This share of emissions from aviation is higher than an average country,
given all four countries have higher per capita carbon footprints to begin with,
have higher than average incomes, and likely have more “high fliers” or “fre-
quent flyers,” especially the Scandinavian countries.
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areas is needed to ensure change in mobility behavior. Positively, the
HOPE project affirms a potential to accept radical changes in con-
sumption among households of high-income countries as longs as this is
done in a fair way.
Essentially, household decision-making and behavioral change are
neither the silver bullet of climate policies, nor purely a consequence of
climate (or energy) policies. Households demand goods and services
that propel economic development and consequently drive emissions
patterns, yet they also reflect broader patterns of infrastructures,
technologies, organizations, markets and practices. Households there-
fore embody the potential to become either active agents of dec-
arbonisation, or aggressive culprits accelerating dangerous emissions.
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Appendix A
As previously mentioned, the HOPE project relied on a mixed methods protocol involving: (1) the estimation and mapping of household carbon
footprints, (2) the output of a climate change mitigation simulation game with households, (3) in-depth qualitative interviews, and (4) the depiction
of climate policy measures that are explicitly or implicitly aimed at influencing household consumption in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
All greenhouse gases were considered and accounted for as CO2e. More details on the methods can be found in the published study protocol [70].
Sampling and Recruitment
We recruited participants by sending letters with support of the local municipality to a random sample of inhabitants of each city. If the needed
sample size could not be achieved in the respective case study city by this method only, we filled up the sample by recruitment via media en-
gagement. To encourage participation and minimize the risk of selection bias (i.e., that only environmentally concerned people would participate),
we offered a secure financial and a lottery incentive, thus appealing to risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals. Such incentives are common, and
have been “used extensively for many years” in the research community to improve response and participation rates [71], although it could also
mean more opportunistic respondents took part. The sample composition is given in Fig. A1.
Method 1: Mapping empirical household carbon footprints
The FCS-Tool first calculated the carbon footprint of each participating household after detailed data about each households’ consumption habits
in the four sectors of Food, Mobility, Housing and Other Consumption were entered. The tool considered formulas to calculate the carbon footprint
by combining the questionnaire inputs on consumption habits (e.g. the kilometers of car use per year and information about the type of car used) and
the corresponding emission factors (e.g. CO2e emissions per kilometer for this specific type of car). The emission factors were either taken from a
common database (the IMPACTS database of the French Environment and Energy Management Agency) or from other databases adapted to the
national contexts whenever necessary (e.g. emission factors for electricity depending on the national or regional energy mix). The individual
household inputs on consumption resulted from a detailed online questionnaire, which covered many items of personal consumption with the
exception of public services. The online questionnaire also asked for spending in all consumption areas and socioeconomic characteristics of the
household. Households usually spent 1.5–2 h to fill in the questionnaire. In a second step the FCS-Tool prepared mitigation actions for each
household. Each of these actions went along with individually tailored estimations on the potential CO2e-savings, financial costs and savings as well
as generic information on health co-benefits for each specific household. These mitigation actions were the basis for the simulation game, described
under Method 2.
Method 2: Conducting a mitigation simulation game with households
At the beginning of our simulation game, which was conducted as a personal on-site interview with each household, we confronted the household
with their current carbon footprint, calculated with data from the online questionnaire. Then we offered households an array of up to 65 climate
change mitigation actions, which they could implement. Those mitigation actions were presented on “Action Cards” and included information about
avoided CO2e emissions, positive or negative financial costs, and health impact if applicable (for examples of actions cards see Fig. A2). The number
of actions varied for each household, as some actions were rated as “already done” (e.g. already vegetarian) or “not applicable” (e.g. not able to
insulate a roof because of living as tenant on the ground floor).
In order to create a realistic atmosphere and engage households into the complex social problem of climate change, we adopted a serious gaming
approach. This means that we invited households to imagine a scenario, in which they were required to reduce their carbon footprint by 50% by
2030. Staying in this frame we first made households familiar with all mitigation actions by asking them to rate all actions on a Likert Scale from 1-5.
We then asked households to choose voluntary actions: “Which actions would you actually like to implement to reduce your carbon footprint by 50%
by 2030?” We then entered the chosen options into the FCS-Tool and confronted households with the resulting CO2e-reduction for their household. If
it was less than 50%, we asked them to choose more or other options to reach the set goal: “Which actions would you choose if you were forced to
reduce your carbon footprint by 50% by 2030? Continue your rank order for round 2. You may choose up to 30 actions in total.” Having a
“voluntary” and a “forced” scenario allowed us to distinguish the spontaneous choices from the ones that were made, because they were necessary to
reach the set goal. At the end of the simulation game, households were presented with a visual presentation of their achieved reduction in general
and in each of the four sectors of Food, Mobility, Housing and Other Consumption.
Within the simulation process the tool detected dynamically incompatible options (e.g. one cannot reduce car use when one had previously
decided to give up the car) and re-computed the resulting carbon footprint dynamically (e.g. if one first chooses to insulate and then change the
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heating system, the CO2e reduction of changing the heating system is lower than if considered alone). Thus, our simulation offered realistic options
for each household and avoided double counting. Furthermore, it visibly displayed the results to households, which made the simulation more
realistic.
For the results in part 3.2 a Multiple Component Analysis (MCA), was performed for the simulation 2 – Round 1 (Rating on Likert scale of
mitigation options). This analysis captures the correlations between socio-demographic household characteristics, home attributes, expenditures and
energy consumptions (illustrative variables) and their preferences for reducing their carbon footprint (active variables, options rated from 1 to 5).
When conducting our MCA, we relied on the techniques suggested by Lebart et al. [72] with notations adapted from Greenacre [73]. Consider a
survey conducted on N respondents who are being asked to answer Q questions each with say mq modalities. Clearly, in our case we have N = 309
HOPE respondents and Q = 65 actions to be ranked, each with mq = 7 modalities.
Thus the modalities encompass the 5 likert ranking scores plus missing and not feasible modalities. We call S the N×Q matrix of responses over
the 65 HOPE actions holding the modality value siq of respondent i to question q: an interger between 1 and 7. Let us call = =M mqQ q1 the total
number of modalities over the Q questions. In our case, M = 65×7 = 455 modalities. Now, matrix S is not suitable for computations which are
actually performed with the N×Mmatrix Z of indicator variables corresponding to S. Matrix Z holds the modality indicator variable for each of the q
questions with for each question q, zij = 1 if modality j was chosen and 0 otherwise. Clearly, because each question has only one nonzero modality,
the row sums are constant and equal to the total number of questions, Q. Meanwhile, column sums give the marginal frequencies of each category.
The computational derivation that is more common in the “French Way” makes use of duality between row and columns. Under the same
notations seen above, from P=(1/NQ)Z, define, =D DM NQ1 where D is the diagonal matrix holding the diagonal elements of B= ZTZ, (an interesting
matrix in itself because it represents the cross-tabulation of all the modalities two by two, the diagonal holding the frequency of the modality over the
whole sample), and =D IN N1N , with IN, the identity matrix of order N. The factorial axes uα are found by diagonalization of the matrix:= =T F D FD Z ZDNT 1 M1 1Q T 1. It follows that in M, the equation of the αth factorial axis is uα is: =Z ZD u u1Q T 1 , meaning that axis uα is
eigenvector of Z ZD1Q T 1 associated to eigenvalue λα. Then, we define the equation of the αth factor as φα=D−1uα, that is written: =D Z ZQ1 1 T .
Fig. A1. Sample composition for the HOPE Project giving total household size, number of children, and consumption units (household income in Euros weighted by
household size and composition, and household income per household). Please note: Country code denotes 1=France, 2= Germany, 3= Norway, 4= Sweden.
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Likewise, the equation of the αth factor ψα in N is written: =ZD Z1Q 1 T . Thus, we can see the duality relationship between row and columns
in MCA, as the factors φα and ψα represent respectively the coordinates of lines and columns on factorial axis α. Notice that both factors have the
same norm: λα, the eigenvalue associated to each factorial axis. Transition relations between factors φα and ψα are thus: = ZD1 1 T and= Z1
Q
.
Practically, computations are performed in the smallest space since the transition formulae allow to deduce coordinates in the dual space once
given. Generally, since observations are far more numerous than variables, one prefers to perform the computations in the column space and thus,
compute eigenvalues in column space, or φα factors. The reverse is true in our case, since we know that N = 309 but Q = 455, thus we performed
the computation in row space, and the factors are the ψα. As a last remark, we can conduct the MCA with two distinct data tables: either the complete
disjunctive table Z or the cross-tabulations hypercube B=ZTZ. It can be shown that the factors are the same, and thus the results at the exception of
the eigenvalues that are the square roots of those in the B=ZTZ case.
The case of illustrative variables does not pose any difficulty. We must find a way correlate the illustrative variables with the results of the MCA.
For categorical variables, this does not pose any problem: one just adds news questions and modalities and finds directly their coordinates through
the transition formula for φα because the factorial coordinate of any modality on any axis is just the product of the inverse square root of the axis
eigenvalue by the arithmetic mean of ψα coordinates of the individuals who have the given modality. Thus, any illustrative categorical variable may
be projected on a given MCA, provided they are observed on the same individuals.
The descriptive preferences analysis in part 3.4 is based on the results of simulation two, rounds two and three, voluntary and forced scenarios.
The percentage of households that chose an action is related to the total households for which the action is applicable, and not already done (see
above). The CO2e reduction potential is an average of the household sample, it refers to the initial potential of CO2e reduction, computed by the
Footprint Calculation and Simulation Tool for each household, and presented on the action cards.
Method 3: Qualitative household interviews
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 64 households, transcribed all interviews verbatim and analyzed them using qualitative content
analysis. Table A1 summarizes the main questions from the interview guide.
Method 4: Policy analysis
Here we provide some more details about the categories we used to code the 250 policies, which we analyzed in our policy analysis. Even more
details can be found in the article by Moberg et al. [25].
The policies were first sorted in four main consumption areas, similar to those used in the simulation game: Housing, Mobility, Food and Other
Consumption.
Secondly, we sorted the policies in accordance to the anticipated policy mechanisms; i.e. how the policies affect household consumption and as a
result of that, GHG emissions. This could happen either though changes in patterns or volume of consumption, and changes in patterns can happen
Fig. A2. Examples for action cards in the four areas of mitigation (Housing, Mobility, Food and Other Consumption) for the HOPE Project, including individually
tailored information on expected CO2e savings per year and financial costs or savings per months.
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either by improving efficiency (e.g. change into a car with better mileage) or substituting consumption (e.g. substitute private car use by public
transportation). An example of reducing consumption is to simply travel less [74].
Finally, we applied the same formal categorization of policy instruments as in the latest IPCC main report, in which we differed between main
categories of instruments: economic instruments (credits, grants, taxes, tax deductions), information policies (information campaigns, research
requests, suasion), and public goods and services (planning, public company, infrastructure). The IPCC categories can also be divided into marked-
based approaches or command-and-control approaches, as we have done in Fig. 5 of this paper, above. Table A2 contrasts these approaches [75–79].
Table A1
Main questions and illustrative scenarios of the interview guide for the HOPE Project.
1. Introduction:
Explanation of how the interview works, what are the objectives, presentation of the interviewer etc.
2. Warming up• How come you signed up for the study?• Info for the interviewer: Go through the HHs carbon footprint from the simulation initial footprint and final footprint with the informant. Ask: What do you think about this today?• What is your thinking regarding climate change more in general?• Do you have a personal interest in climate change issues/any personal experience?
3. Climate change mitigation
a) Household changes• Show the HHs first 2-3 options from I2 one by one, step 2 first and step 3 thereafter and some actions they did not chose (to capture attitudes to voluntarily versus forced changes). Ask: How
come you made these choices? (step 2 first, step 3 thereafter and non-choices last)• Seeing yourself in a low carbon future – what do you think it would mean for people in general (probe on quality of life/lifestyle/health, economy)?• In the HH follow up questions you ranked the importance of some aspects when it comes to implementing your selected actions (1= most important, 3= least important). You
ranked XX highest and XX lowest. What do you think about the answers today? What is the most important for you today?
b) Health co-benefits of CC mitigation (not relevant for this paper)
c) General changes• Info for the interviewer: Look at the HH’s responses in HH follow up question 7 from the simulation (Q7 « 1) Climate change is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps
now even if this involves significant costs. 2) The problems of climate change should be addressed, but it effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking
steps that are low in cost. 3) Until we are sure that climate change is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have significant costs ») Ask: In the follow up questions
after the climate game you wrote that the statement XX comes closest to your view. Please explain how you reason?• What are your feelings regarding climate change? (Anxiety, guilt, anger/frustration ...). How come?• How do you see the future in a world where the climate changes?• How do you believe climate change will affect population health, as well as your health?• Who do you consider responsible for climate mitigation? (Probe on the role of government, industries, community, HH)• How do you judge the possibility that we in (own Country) will succeed as a country to reach the EU targets? (Inform about the targets set before asking)
4) Motivation and barriers for change
a) Perceptions on implementing -50% changes• Read out and ask: In December 2015 there was an UN agreement to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius, and pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5. This means that large scale
emission reductions are needed. That is why we in the climate game asked you to reduce emissions by 50% by 2030. How do you feel about halving your HHs carbon footprint, does
it mean big sacrifices or is it easy? What would the consequences be for you?• What would have to happen regarding effects from climate change to make you implement bigger changes, major ones compared to today? (Ex. For probing: close or distant changes,
weather extremes/variability, disasters, access to clean water/air, heat waves, infectious disease transmission etc.)• Show the HHs first ranked 2-3 options from I2 step 3, one by one, and thereafter the lowest 2-3 prioritized options. Ask: Based on the climate game - you prioritized this action high, how
come? What would you need to be able to accomplish this? You gave this a low priority. How come?• What information/what kind of support would you need to implement major changes?• Info for the interviewer: Show the HH follow up question number 6 “To what degree are you intending to implement in the near future the actions you have selected in the third round of
the interview? (Please show their ranking: 1= “not at all” to 5 = “likely”). Ask: How do you today view the realism in implementing your forced choices?• Why did you choose xx and not xx when it came to forced choices (for example, what made you choose to become vegetarian in order to reduce your CF and finally hit 50% reduction
and not to reduce your flights)?
b) Household change scenario
Info for the interviewer: There are several different scenarios below. Prepare before the interview so there is an idea on what scenarios to use. Choose ONE that you judge relevant for the HH
you interview. If it is a HH with many children number 4 may be extra interesting or if it is a technology interested HH number 5 might be most interesting.
One example for the scenarios out of five given scenarios: Imagine that you have children who want to travel abroad on holidays and who you also want to show some nice places. But
you know that travelling is not climate-friendly, and you want our planet to remain healthy for the next generation. How do you feel about this? How would you do yourself? What
would make it easier for you to act in accordance with your own values?
c) Household specific question (only if there was something interesting noted from I2)
d) Country specific policy scenarios:
Info for the interviewer: Use TWO scenarios fitting (the HH and) your own country/city illustrating the conflict between government regulation and freedom to choose individual action.
One example for the proposed scenarios (2 scenarios per sector were available): Imagine the (country) government would prohibit the sale of (new) cars with a conventional
engine (diesel or gasoline) from 2030. This could be similar to bans on oil furnaces for heating of buildings that are already introduced in some cities (ex. Bergen). What do you
think about this? How do you feel about such decisions made by others? (OBS! This is suggested to be introduced on new cars in Norway by 2025, although not concluded).
Table A2
Policy instruments considered as marked based or command-and-control in the HOPE policy analysis.
Market-based approaches: Command-and-control approaches
• Audit processes • Legislative and regulative measures• Enforced self-regulation • Responsibility to act within bureaucratic apparatuses• Regulated participation bodies • Public services provided by the state• Competition focus• Marketization and privatization of public services• Personal responsibility to act• Self-surveillance measures• Standardization, benchmarking, best practice schemes, performance indicators
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